Introduction
This chapter offers a brief introduction to Plato's middle-period theory of Forms (TF) as this theory is found in Phaedo, Cratylus, and Republic. Actually, the TF is not Plato's central concern in any of his dialogues; part I of Parmenides is an exception in this regard. To be sure, Forms are crucial to Plato's philosophy, and Plato is sure that any philosophy worthy of being called such cannot function without the TF. Yet the TF is discussed in a rather scattered manner in his dialogues (including the three dialogues just named) and never amounts to an entirely neat and consistent theory. More often than one would think, Plato himself confesses to not having an entirely coherent vision of Forms. However, certain important patterns still emerge from his scattered discussions, which give us a somewhat stable sense of what his Forms are, are not, how we may come to know them, and the ontological and epistemological functions they have.
My aim in this chapter is to simply present the imprecise TF that Phaedo, Cratylus, and Republic offer without attempting to reconstruct it. I adopt this largely noninterventionist approach to avoid rigging these dialogues to suit the purposes of any pregiven agenda. In the ensuing chapters, I will use the information obtained here to evaluate various interpretations of Parmenides, including my own.
The Theory of Forms in Phaedo
The main narrator in Phaedo is Phaedo, a fictional character modeled after a devoted student of Socrates. We are told that Phaedo, along with Simmias, Cebes, and others, was with Socrates during his last day; Plato was absent because he "was ill" (59b).
1 Every comment attributed to Socrates in this dialogue is narrated by Phaedo to Echecrates, who wishes to learn more about Socrates's final hours. Socrates spends his final hours discussing his impending death philosophically. His ultimate message to his grieving friends is that his bodily death will not be the end of him. In order to convince them, he has to prove the immortality of the soul. Giving this proof is the main aim of Phaedo.
Socrates's proof of the immortality of the soul depends heavily on his theory of knowledge. At about eight Stephanus pages into the dialogue, Socrates says the body hinders the acquisition of true knowledge. Even the superior senses of sight and hearing are too "inaccurate and indistinct" to give us true knowledge. For this reason, the soul will be "deceived" if it relies on sense perception. In other words, true knowledge must be "revealed" to the soul "in thought" or through pure reflection, "and thought is best when the mind," which is the rational part of the soul, is not disturbed by any of the bodily senses. In short, in the acquisition of true knowledge, the soul must ignore the body as much as possible (65a-c).
This theory of knowledge is related to the TF. Since true knowledge depends on avoiding the senses, which sense the sensible objects, it follows that the proper objects of knowledge cannot be sensible things. Rather, they are the "absolute" entities called Forms. Socrates stipulates first that there must be such entities as "absolute justice," "absolute beauty," and "absolute good," which are the Forms of Justice, Beauty, and Good. Forms such as these are "the essences or true nature of everything." This formulation already assumes that Forms participate in sensible things and give them their "essence," or essential identity, in so doing (65d-66a).
Nevertheless, even though they somehow participate in these objects, Forms qua Forms cannot be among or within sensible objects. For this reason, in order to have "true knowledge," the soul must depart from the body and visit the nonexistential realm of Forms. This could only happen "after death." In "this present life, . . . we [can only] make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body" (66e-67b). Here, Socrates has already assumed two things: perfect knowledge is
